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SOME FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIVESTITURE LEGISLATION
John Griffith and Jack W. Waldrip
Eastern Illinois University
Charleston. Illinois

Abstract
Those critical of divestiture legislation emphasize both the
relative lack of concentration and the advantages of grouping
the development of two or more energy materials under the
management of one corporate business. Many of these arguments
are extremely difficult to evaluate without harder evidence
than appears to be available at present.
This paper purports
to deal with some of the financial and legal consequences of
different possible methods of accomplishing divestiture.
1.

INTRODUCTION

The anger of consumers at the increase
in oil prices following the 1973 embargo
has resulted in a search for political
measures to lower all prices by enforcing
conditions of competition in the oil
industry. Over thirty pieces of legisla
tion have been introduced into Congress
calling for the break up of the largest
oil companies. The advisability of this
measure poses a complicated question
made up of many different but interrelated
facets that should be studied carefully.
2.

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS

The consumer resentment resulted in the
proposal of three bills in the first two
months of 1977* Two house bills (H.R.683,
introduced in January and H.R.3370 intro
duced in February) are identical.*
They are known as the Energy Industry

Divestiture Act and provide for amendment
to the Clayton Act requiring of every oil
company above a certain minimum level of
production:
(l)

( 2)

(3)

Horizontal divestiture by which
energy companies are prohibited
from controlling more than one
energy source.
Vertical divestiture by which
energy companies are prohibited
from engaging in more than one
stage of production.
Prohibition of joint ventures
between major companies devel
oping energy resources unless
they receive federal permission.

The Federal Trade Commission is empowered
to approve submitted plans for compliance
with these requirements and may conduct
hearings and call for evidence or infor
mation sufficient to evaluate plan merits
and compliance.

*U7 S., Congress, House, A Bill to Amend the Clayton Act to Prohibit Undue
Concentration in the Energy-Producing Industries, and for Other Purposes, H.R.683
and H.R.3370, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977.
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A third bill called the Petroleum Industry
Competition Act (S.795) was submitted to
the Senate January 4th of this year, and
is identical to a bill that was approved
almost a year earlier by a very close vote
of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary.* It differs from the two
House bills in the following respects:
(1)

(2)

(3)

Actions representing appeal from
administrative decision may be
brought only in the Temporary
Petroleum Industry Divestiture
Court, with appeal only to the
Supreme Court.
3.

ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

It has been established that although only
the Justice Department can enforce the
Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Justice Department
have joint enforcement jurisdiction with
regard to both the Clayton and the F.T.C.
Acts of 191^. In addition to its own
enforcement powers, the F.T.C. may also
be designated as a "master of chancery"
to determine appropriate relief in a suit
instituted by the Attorney General.**
Since about 1948 these two agencies have
cooperated to avoid effort duplication.
Each case is assigned according to its
characteristics as well as to the capa
bilities of the respective agencies.***

It calls for vertical integra
tion, only, requiring (with some
exceptions) the separation of
energy extraction refining,
transport, and marketing assets.
The Federal Trade Commission
would play the enforcing role
(more thoroughly spelled out in
this than the two House bills),
along with legal prerogatives
of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

*U. S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Restore and to Promote Competition in the
Petroleum Industry, and for Other Purposes, S.795, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977*
In addition, there have been many deconcentration bills proposed or introduced into
Congress in recent years, aimed sometimes at individual industries and sometimes at
Big Business in general. See Concentrated Industries Act (S.2614), introduced by
Senator Fred Harris in 1971, and Phil C. Neal et al., "Report of the White House Task
Force on Antitrust Policy," Antitrust Law and Economics Review 2 (Winter 1968-69); 1176.
Senator Philip Hart introduced a general deconcentration bill and indicated target
industries in the following order of priority:
chemicals and drugs, electronic com
puting and communication equipment, energy, iron and steel, motor vehicles, and nonferrous metals. This priority was based on these industries’ comparative contribution
to inflation.
Remedies included divestiture bv soinoff. reDlacement of long-term s u d d Iv
contracts bv frequently negotiated ones, alteration of a firm's financial backing com
mitments, elimination of exclusive dealerships, alteration of advertising expenditures,
licensing of patents and trademarks, and divestment of certain assets. See Industrial
Reorganization Act of 1972 (S.3832) and Philip A. Hart, "Restructuring the Oligopoly
Sector:
The Case for a New Industrial Reorganization Act," Antitrust Law and Economics
Review 5 (Summer 1972):
35-49.
**"Comments: Aspects of Divestiture,", pp. 139-140. That the duality of enforce
ment is pervasive is indicated by the following rule of thumb summarizing the civil
jurisdiction of the two agencies:
(1) Price fixing, boycotts, vertical restraints and
market division agreements which are per se illegal and other agreements in restraint of
trade which are in being and demonstrable in effect— FTC and Justice; (2) Trade prac
tices constituting potential or incipient restraints of trade— FTC only; (3) Price and
other trade discrimination— FTC and Justice, although the Antitrust Division does not
initiate proceedings involving only this section of the statute; (4) Exclusive dealing
and tying arrangements— FTC and Justice; (5) Mergers, adquisitions and joint ventures—
FTC and Justice; (6) Director interlocks— FTC and Justice.
(David Roll, "Dual Enforce
ment of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison
Procedure," The Business Lawyer 31 [July, 1976]:
2077.)
***Ibid., pp. 2076-77.
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M.

HORIZONTAL DIVESTITURE

5.

The proposed House bills prohibits any en
ergy company from controlling more than
one basic energy source. This is pro
scribed in the theory that if the nowexisting energy companies (oil, coal, etc.)
are allowed to become energy-source diver
sified then competition among coal, gas,
uranium, oil, and the more exotic sources
as they develop, will ease, resulting in
higher prices charged to consumers.
Oil companies, in defense, argue that
their concerted expansion into coal and
uranium beginning about 1965 was the re
sult of after-tax profit considerations.
Actually, concentration levels in fossil
fuel industries are relatively low,.evi
denced by the fact that there are 25 other
U.S. industries with higher concentration
ratios than energy.*
Oil apologists assent that the record be
lies the belief that oil companies would
ignore the necessary expansion of other
forms of energy while exploiting oil and
gas. The record seems to indicate that
there are nine oil companies controlling
substantial development activity in coal,
while all but four in the top 20 oil com
panies are in uranium development with
Kerr-McGee and Standard of New Jersey
apparently the leader in uranium mining
activities.** Also, according to oil pro
ponents there are also some managerial
advantages accruing from the movement of
oil to acquire coal and uranium interests.
First, there are possible economies in
volved in the better utilization of
management by "spreading it thinner."
Because of the complementary nature of the
technologies involved, this is especially
true in regard to oil and gas expansion
into coal. Also, the research that the oil
companies have engaged in should be of
great value in developing a workable coal
conversion technology because both oil
and coal are hydrocarbons.***

VERTICAL DIVESTITURE

The rationale for limiting each energy cor
poration to one stage of energy production
is that many producers dealing with many
transporters dealing with many processors
dealing with many retailers will result
in lower prices than when all stages are
controlled by one firm. The claim is that
vertically Integrated firms are able to
control the market to the detriment of both
the non-integrated energy competition and
the consumer.
It is also claimed that the
bills will restrict the ability of the
international oil companies to ration
Mid-East oil to consumers by passing on
to them the high royalty payments rather
than bidding them down. It is thus
alleged that Big Oil's supposed efficiency
is based on the technique of monopolizing
raw materials: that integration guarantees
other levels of the integrated operation a
supply of something to buy or sell. It
should be mentioned, however, that the evi
dence indicates that small producers do
gain access of offshore oil.****
There seem to be three basic kinds of
benefits commonly recognized as a result
of integration. The first is economics
of scale resulting from the superior or
ganizational efficiency in any one large
production unit or firm than in a small
one which is made possible by the greater
profits accruing from the other integrational benefits. The survivor techniques
of comparing industry domination by firms
of different sizes at different times
has revealed big-firm cost advantages
in crude oil and natural gas production,
coal mining, and uranium mining, but not
so much in oil refining. Second, cost
savings from integration are likely
where the use of independent firms would
involve frequent and difficult bargaining
due to Junckert.airtle s and complex techno
logies. In this situation integration
could increase the degree of internal
coordination and efficiency.*****

*T. D. Duchesneau, Competition in the U.S. Energy Industry (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger, 1975), P- 96, and Dismembering the Oil Companies (Washington, D. C.:
American Petroleum Institute, 1976), p. 1.
**Cordell Moore, Energy: U.S. at the Crossroads (Charleston, 111.: Eastern Illi
nois University Energy Resource Management Program, 1975) and Duchesneau, pp. 8 and 86.
***Moore, passim.
****Duchesneau, p. 101; W. P. Tavoulareas, "Is Divestiture the Answer?"
Post-Dispatch, 3 February 1976, p. 2B.
*****Duchesneau, passim.
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Third, integration could also have bene
ficial effects where the costs of obtain
ing information and/or the costs of
enforcing contracts are high.* Another
benefit to vertically integrated firms can
come from shifting profits from one level
to another.**
Have Big Oil companies, indeed, enjoyed
higher profits from their advantages?
Ratio analysis has been used to compare
the dividend experience of petroleum com
pany stockholders with those holding
Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Composite
Ratio analysis has also been used to
compare average accounting return on in
vested capital. Both these methods indi
cate that petroleum stockholders received
lower than normal dividends and that return
on invested capital was at -least no higher
than for other sectors of industry.***
The abnormally high 1974 profit was largely
due to the effect of the use of the FIFO
method of inventory valuation which infla
ted valuation of oil inventory.****
One argument for integration is the propo
sition that it brings a degree of revenue
stability to the oil company so structured.
That non-integrated firms experienced
average monthly fluctuations in gross mar
gins four times greater than an integrated
refiner has been revealed by recent re
search. Evidentally, because integrated
firms hold what amounts to diversified
asset portfolios, they tend to be able to
reduce the risks attendant to investment
and can therefore attract capital at less
cost.*****

Considering that the Alaskan pipeline cost
$7 billion, a single North Sea drilling
platform $750 million, and a competitive
refinery $500 million, it seems doubtful
that breaking down the large integrated
oil companies from 18 to 72 would facili
tate the raising of the required huge
capital sums.****** Indeed, even in their
present size may have difficulty, accord
ing to recent studies, generating the
estimated $315 billion required in the
next decade to maintain 60 percent national
self-sufficiency.******* Although govern
mental mechanisms exist to assist capital
markets— such as raising (or decontrolling)
energy prices, the reinstitution of deple
tion allowances, subsidization, or outand-out nationalization, we must be wary
lest the cure turn out be worse than the
disease.********
On the international front, OPEC will
probably survive, perhaps even nurtured
by the implementation of divestiture.
If divestiture implementation decreases
U.S. productive efficiency, either we will
become more dependent on foreign aid or
consumers will suffer from substantially
higher energy prices or both. A recent
F. T. C. staff report indicates, on the
one hand, a larger number of customers
might contribute to lower prices by making
it easier for oil-producing nations to
cheat on cartel prices, whereas on the
other hand the F. T. C. conjectures that
removal of the major oil companies’
structure and size would be likely to
increase foreign oil prices by sacrificing
the oil companies' efficiency of opera
tion. *********

*Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston:
p. 175.

Little, Brown & Co., 1973),

**J. E. Inman, "Price Decontrol and Competition in the Oil Industry," Business
Law Review 9 (Spring 1976): 19-27.
1976)49*

HaSS 6t al*» Financing the Energy Industry (Cambridge, Mass.:

Ballinger,

****Moore, p. 19.
*«#*#Stark Ritchie, "Petroleum Dismemberment," Vanderbilt Law Review 29 (Winter
1976 ): 1136 .
---------------------------------*###**»F0rced Divestiture in Oil?" Morgan Guaranty Survey, June 1976, p. 9.
»»»»»»»The petroleum Situation (New York:
p. 21; Hass et al., p. 21.

Chase Manhattan Bank, 1976); Hass,

et al., "A Forecast of Capital Demand and Supply in the Domestic
Petroleum Industry 1975-1985." Paper read at Financial Management Association Meeting,
Montreal, 1976.
**«******n011 Q0mpany Breakup," in Energy Management (CCH Issue No. 194).
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great deal of collusion between parent
companies wholly outside the area of joint
venture.
One company would be reluctant
to endanger In any way another company's
benefits.****

Some critics of divestiture predict even
more dire consequences.
As experts in
corporate law warned the Senate Anti-Trust
Subcommittee, any long-term contracts
entered into between the prohibited U.S.
overseas subsidiaries and foreign compan
ies or foreign governments would have to
be terminated.* Foreign countries might
even impose their own restructuring or
even nationalize foreign oil assets.**
6.

Because little is known about the economies
of scale involved in joint ventures, it
would appear that permitting the continued
operation and formation of joint ventures
under government supervision might not
be bad policy until further evaluative
information can be obtained. These have,
however been testimony and evidence that
the people who run the government energysupervising agencies have or have had
close ties with energy industries.*****
This would, if true, indicate the need
for addition of experts with a more objec
tive point of view to those regulatory
bodies.

JOINT VENTURES

The third part of the proposed House bills
calls for an end to joint ventures between
major oil companies developing energy
resources unless they receive government
permission. A significant number of oil
and gas joint ventures occur in offshore,
production, pipeline ownership and opera
tion, and international operations.***
Both advantages and disadvantages can
accrue to society from joint venture rela
tionship .

7.

DIVESTITURE PROBLEMS

If divestiture legislation should be passed
by Congress, there probably would be much
legal machination and financial confusion
during the Implementation phase.
In the
long term capital market, for example, the
split-up of assets among the newly formed
companies would in many cases reduce the
security counted on at time of purchase
perhaps enabling bondholders to demand
acceleration unless the FTC were allowed
by the courts to summarily rewrite these
covenants.

Joint ventures permit the entry of small
businesses into activities requiring large
capital investments.
Also involved is
the willingness of many firms acting to
gether to take a big risk where they
would be reluctant to do so alone. And
last, large investments may benefit more
than just the direct joint venture DarticiDants, while seoarate oDeration bv anv
one individual firm misht be economically
inefficient.
It has been argued, however
that the very existence of some joint
venture relationships will result in a
*Forced Divestiture in Oil?" p. 9-

**J. L. Katz, "Department Discusses International Aspects of Legislation,"
Department of State Bulletin, 28 June 1976, pp . 821-25.
***W. A. Johnson et al., Competition in the Oil Industry, Energy Policy Research
Project (Washington, D. C.: Ge or ge Washington University, 1976), p. 66.
****johnson et al., p. 56; S. H. Ruttenberg, The American Oil Industry (New York:
M. E. B. A., 1973), P- 45.

#**##Walter Mead, "Joint Ventures: Anti-Competitive and Pro-Competitive Effects,"
in Market Performance and Competition in the Petroleum Industry (Washington, D. C . :
U.s: Government Printing Office).
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Furthermore, the new companies resulting
from the break-up of Big Oil would probably
experience difficulty raising the capital
so necessary to continued exploration and
production for at least four reasons:
(1) New companies would have no financial
or operating history from which to pro
ject future earnings. (2) The absence of
any such financial history might preclude
through the operation of state law any
investment in the securities of new
companies by state-regulated fiduciaries.
(3) It might take some period of time
even after the new companies were formed
for the legal processes to determine
fully which assets were to go to which
new corporation.
(4) The increased uncer
tainty would make the cost of borrowing
higher for the new companies than would
have been the case for Big Oil. Although
divestiture has at times in the past in
creased stock prices of the divesting
company, this involved the voluntary
divestiture of an unprofitable operation
in the company interest. In contrast,
proposed legislation calls for involuntary
divestiture, implying that it is not in
the company interest.*
Indeed, as an argument for divestiture,
some commentators point to the ease with
which the Standard Oil spinoff was accom
plished in 1911, without noting a basic
difference: all of the 33 companies
divested were complete legal units, so
that there was no legal problem of identi
fying the assets of each company.** The
spinoff device used to "unmerge" Standard
Oil of New Jersey resulted in no change
of ownership: just a change in the form
of ownership. The record seems to indi
cate that the successor companies to
Standard Oil for two decades or so came

to dominate regional markets and reinte
grated control of production during this
period. The court evidently did not anti
cipate the ensuing development of regional
monopolies, which had abated by 1947,
when only eight of 20 industry leaders
were successor companies.***
Another factor complicating divestiture
today as compared with the Standard Oil
spinoff is that the Federal Securities
and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 would
have to be complied with. In S.795 the
powers of the Securities and Exchange
Commission are explicitly preserved, and
the SEC is written into the Act as ad
visor both to the Federal Trade Commission
in its function of approving submitted
divestiture plans and to the new
Divestiture Court in its entertainment
of appeal from the FTC. Although there
is no mention of the SEC made in the
House bills, neither do they contain any
thing that would suggest at all any
intended diminution or modification of
SEC prerogatives. In the divestiture
process, the SEC would be primarily con
cerned with the requirement to disclose
the financial condition of any company
whose stock was circulated for the first
time in accordance with a plan approved
by the FTC or the Divestiture Court.****
Furthermore, any discussion of oil con
centration is complicated by the fact
that the biggest companies do not operate
independently, but rather through a
complex web of criss-crossing business
deals that tie them together at dozens
of points. They exchange oil and tankers,
share pipeline space, and swap refined
products. Probably the greatest argument
against divestiture is the short-run

*John
Griffith, "Some Financial Effects of Divestiture," a paper prepared for
delivery at the 9th Annual Conference of American Institute for Decision Sciences,
October 19-21, 1977, Chicago, Illinois.
**S. R. Reid, "Petroleum Mergers, Multinational Investments, Refining Capacity,
and Performance in the Energy Crisis," Financial Management, Winter 1973, pp- 50-56;
"Why Break Up Oil Companies?" Reprint from Oil and Gas Journal, 10 May 1976.
***Stephen Fraidin, "Dissolution and Reconstitution: A Structural Remedy, and
Alternatives," George Washington Law Review 33 (1965): 914.
****John R. Griffith, "Dimensions of Divestiture Legislation" a paper presented
at the 54th Annual Meeting of the American Business Law Association, August 21-25, 1977,
Miami Beach, Florida.
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confusion attendant on its implementation
and the price of this transition period
in terms of lost energy. During the
transition, economic and financial losses
could be staggering. Until a divestiture
plan was agreed upon, until the inevitable
litigation was settled, and until actual
dismemberment was carried out, no one
could at all assess the form or potential
of the post-divestiture oil industry.
Oil officials estimate that if dismember
ment had taken place during the 1976-77
period, it could have increased unemploy
ment by 1.5 million, caused a loss in
GNP of $85 billion, added $100 billion to
the payments drain from 1975 to 1985, and
adversely affected millions of investors.*
8.

companies; a director of one firm site on
the board of a competing firm, and vice
versa. Primary interlocks are explicitly
declared illegal in Section 8 of the Ciayton Act: no person shall, at the same
time, sit on the board of directors of any
two corporations who, owing to the charac
ter of their business, are directly
competitive.
As straight forward as this
pronouncement may seem, the concept is
open to interpretation in a few instances,
most notably that where an oil company
director sits on the board of a coal
company or a utility.
A study by the
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association
identifies four instances of such intimate
association of major oil companies with
coal companies not owned directly by
them.*** Further, this study alleges to
identify an outright violation of
Section 8 in the case of one director who
serves on the board of directors of both
Standard Oil of Ohio and Diamond Shamrock
Corporation. The report goes on to point
out six cases of direct interlock between
major oil companies and large utilities,
prominent among those in the midwest
being Standard of Indiana and Commonwealth
Edison.****

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

Since the turn of the century, reformers—
primarily legislators and representatives
of Federal regulatory agencies— have been
voicing great concern over the evils of
the integrated structures within the
petroleum industry. The question of anti
competitive behavior of the vertically
integrated company is still in dispute.**
In theory, however, the charges against
vertical integration are groundless; if
one level in the structure is competitive,
all levels should behave equally compet
itively. Lateral integration, on the
other hand, is intolerable under an anti
trust philosophy, and direct integration
of this kind is expressly prohibited by
law.

A subsequent furor brought forth a rash of
bills in the Congress in 1974, sponsored
by Senator Abourezk, Messengers Dingell,
Ford, Abzug, et. al ., condemning the
energy industry’s integrated structure as
collusive and suppressive of free compe
tition. All of these bills (a total of
some 30) demand the immediate dismantling
of the integrated petroleum industry
through the legislation of divestiture.
To date no proposed divestiture legisla
tion has been enacted into law.*****

The interlocking corporate directorship
is a salient link in the establishment of
intimate intercorporate relationships.
Directorships may interlock in several
ways, but usually they are characterized—
according to the directness of the
linkage— as primary or secondary. The
primary interlock simply provides for
overlapping directorates between oil

*John R. Griffith.
"Dimensions of Divestiture Legislation." a paper presented at
the 54th Annual Meeting of the American Business Law Association on August 21-25,
1977, Miami Beach, Florida.
**The Energy Industry, Part, 9: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, January, 1975*
***MEBA, The American Oil Industry:
1973, PP- 81 ff.

A Failure of Antitrust Policy, New York, NY,

****Ibld., pp. 81, 82.
*****cf.
S.3318, April 5, 197^; H.R.10418, September 20, 1973.
February 20, 1974; H.R.13030, February 26, 1974.
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H.R.12902,

Secondary, or indirect, interlocks are
generally described as appearing in one
of two forms:
1.
2.

9.

CONCLUSION

Today in our more sophisticated economy,
divestiture creates problems considerably
different from those faced In the
Standard Oil spinoff. The SEC was not
established until the early 1930's, so
there were no SEC disclosure regulations
to comply with. The 16th Amendment was
not ratified until 1913, so tax conse
quences did not have to be considered.
Another important difference is the
wide public ownership of industry today
(2.3 million Americans own shares
directly and 11.75 million own shares
indirectly in the six largest oil
companies), contrasted with the high de
gree of control in the hands of a relative
few in the past. Today's average share
holder is innocent regarding his corpora
tion's antitrust violations, and his
interest should be given a high priority
in drafting any plan for divestiture.
And in this age of job specialization,
special consideration should also be
given to the contractual and social
rights of affected employees, so as to
minimize disruption.***

Board members of competing firms
sit on the board of a third com
pany, e.g. a bank.
Board members of a third company
sit on the boards of competing
firms.

There are, of course, many variations on
these forms, but legislative reformers as
a whole tend to view indirect interlocks
as inherently malevolent as the direct
form. Angus McDonald goes so far as to
assert that indirect interlocks form a
"cozy and exclusive club" conducive
to unlimited conspiratorial action.*
A recent paper on energy policy at George
Washington University insists that there
is a dearth of reliable information to
support any attack on indirect interlocks.
Further, "the issue is essentially irrel
evant to a serious discussion of competi
tion in the petroleum industry." It is
the corporation's management, not its
board of directors, who are in the better
position to exert influence in the direc
tion of suppressive or collusive
behaviors.**
Finally, in calling for divestment of
offending organizational components in the
petroleum industry, no proposed legisla
tion purports to address the question of
a prescribed course of action for the
board member who was, himself, the key to
the interlock. Must he resign from the
board of the divested firm? Must he liqui
date his personal holdings or may he
continue as before? There appears to be
no serious attempt to have answered these,
or several other, nagging issues.
*McDonald, Angus. Interlocking Oil:
Washington, D. C., 1971*, pp. 7-8.

Big Oil Ties with Other Corporations.

••Johnson, Messick, VanVactor, & Wyant. Competition in the Oil Industry, Energy
Policy Research Project, The George Washington University, Washington, D. C., 1976,
pp. 87-88.
•••"Comments:

Aspects of Divestiture," p. 142.
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